etminan
Enterprise

Capabilities for regulated, high-assurance deployments.

Etminan's core is free, open, and self-hosted — and stays that way. On top of it, a growing set of capabilities targets larger organizations with a SOC, an auditor, and separation-of-duties requirements: native SIEM output, dual-control approvals, and compliance mapping. Every one of them is opt-in, and off by default — nothing here changes how an existing deployment behaves until you turn it on.

Status. The 0.9.0 features below (starting with SIEM output) are in development and not yet published — this page describes what is arriving, so you can plan for it. In-development and planned items are labelled as such; don't read them as already shipped.

Off by default. Every capability on this page is disabled unless you explicitly configure it. A default install stays exactly as simple, and as auditable, as it is today.

0.9.0 · not yet published Off by default
SIEM integration

Native SIEM output — CEF or LEEF over syslog.

For a SOC that already ingests syslog into Splunk, QRadar, Microsoft Sentinel, or Elastic. When enabled, Etminan emits one structured syslog event per finding and per signed operator action — enrollment, baseline approve / reject / exclude, TLS and attestation-key rotation, and operator-key registry changes — so integrity events land in the same pipeline your analysts already watch, without polling an API or parsing prose.

Events go to the local /dev/log socket by default (the host's own syslog daemon forwards them onward), or straight to a remote collector over UDP via ETMINAN_SIEM_SYSLOG_ADDR. Facility local0; severities map cleanly (critical → err, warning → warning, action → info). It is an addition to the existing notification channels (email, Slack, PagerDuty, generic webhook), not a replacement.

Off by default. The switch is ETMINAN_SIEM_FORMAT=cef (or leef); unset — or unrecognized — means nothing is emitted. Best-effort by design: a broken or unreachable syslog target never breaks a verification run.

In development Off by default
Separation of duties

Dual control — two-person approval for high-consequence actions.

The actions that change what a host is trusted to look like — approving a new baseline, rejecting drift — can be made to require more than one authorized operator's signature (an N-of-M scheme), with distinct roles (viewer, reviewer, approver, admin) and every action bound to a named identity in the hash-chained audit trail. This meets the four-eyes and separation-of-duties expectations common under ISO 27001, SOX, and internal-audit regimes — the audit log answers which person, not just which key.

It builds directly on the operator-key authorization registry that shipped in 0.8.0 (authorized signers, split into admin and operational roles, with signed rotation and revocation).

Off by default. Until you enable a multi-signature policy, the existing single-approver workflow is completely unchanged.

Shipped · 0.8.0 Opt-in
Already available

Governance and hardware-provenance foundations that already shipped.

The enterprise story isn't all forward-looking — two capabilities aimed squarely at regulated, high-assurance deployments shipped in 0.8.0, and dual control (above) builds directly on the first of them:

  • Operator-key authorization & key lifecycle. A signed, audit-chained registry of authorized signers — split into admin keys (the only keys that may change the registry) and operational keys — with time-bounded rotation and revocation, plus host attestation-key rotation. It turns operator keys from accountability-only into a governed set, and is the separation-of-duties foundation dual control is built on. Opt-in: until you run operator-key init it stays in legacy accountability-only mode, so existing deployments are unchanged.
  • Manufacturer EK-certificate provenance. Optional at enrollment (enroll --ek-roots <dir>): the host must present a manufacturer EK certificate whose key matches its activated Endorsement Key and chains to a root CA you provide — a genuine-hardware assurance layer on top of same-TPM residency, for discrete TPMs where a software or emulated TPM must be ruled out. RSA CAs only; without the flag, enrollment is unchanged.
Planned Opt-in
On the enterprise roadmap

More, being built for enterprise deployments now.

Priorities shaped by real regulated deployments rather than guessed at. Listed honestly as what they are — in development or planned, not yet shipped:

  • Compliance control mapping. Traceability from Etminan's controls to the frameworks your auditor already tests against — ISO 27001, NIS2, SOC 2, and PCI-DSS — so file-integrity monitoring maps to a named control instead of needing to be argued from scratch.
  • Air-gapped / offline operation. A fully-disconnected mode with local-only artifact provisioning and a clear statement of which features degrade when cut off — for classified networks and OT/ICS segments where an outbound connection isn't an option.
  • Role-based access control. Finer-grained operator roles layered on top of dual control, so day-to-day review, approval, and administration can be held by different people.
Design principle

Every enterprise feature is opt-in.

None of this changes how Etminan behaves out of the box. Each capability stays disabled until you explicitly configure it, so a default install remains exactly as simple — and as auditable — as it is today. That's a deliberate rule, not an accident: a tool whose whole job is to detect unexpected change should never grow surprising new behavior of its own on an upgrade.

Talk to us

Deploying Etminan in a regulated environment?

If you're evaluating Etminan for a SOC, a regulated industry, or an air-gapped site, tell us what you need — the SIEM format you ingest, your dual-control policy, the compliance framework you're audited against. It genuinely shapes what we build next, and it's the fastest way to get a feature you need onto the near-term list.

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